

TOP SECRET



24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations Under NSC 10/5

1. Attached is the latest draft of [redacted] paper which was completed in [redacted] office on Friday 18 July 1952. In accordance with your request, [redacted] has agreed to call a meeting of the larger committee to review the paper.

2. I believe the paper, as now written, is acceptable from our standpoint in the sense that nothing contained in it does violence to our plans and programs. On the other hand I think it contributes little or nothing to our requirement for guidance more specific than that contained in the appropriate NSC documents. For that reason, I have some doubts as to the advisability of publishing and circulating the paper as it now stands.

3. The fourth paragraph of the paper states that its objective is "to outline a strategic concept for a national psychological program." Paragraph eight of the paper concludes that "we are unable at present to propose a strategic concept which outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold war." From this the paper concludes that efforts to bring about this cumulative retraction of Soviet power and influence as opposed to a program for a definitive solution may be regarded as the interim strategic concept.

4. To my mind this is little more than a restatement of Paragraph 1-A of NSC 10/5 which approves an intensification of covert operations in order to "contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence." In other words, we go through a lot of dialectical gyrations and come out exactly where we started.

5. There is a somewhat more hopeful passage which says that it is possible to "give more precise form to the psychological operations which should be prosecuted in accordance with the interim strategic concept, and to provide an indication of priorities."

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011

AUTH: 30 MAR

DATE: 30 MAR


Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800070013-7

TOP SECRET

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES
TS 81124

TOP SECRET

25X1



The paper however falls far short of actually accomplishing this.

6. Paragraph thirteen states the greatest emphasis should be placed upon weakening Kremlin control over its internal assets;



This has already been stated in somewhat different and more precise language in Paragraph one of NSC 10/5.

25X1

25X1



25X1

8. I have taken the position with [redacted] that Item c above, which is now limited to exacerbating dissension among individuals, should be broadened to include communist groups as well. [redacted]


25X1

25X1

[redacted] has not accepted this broadening and I have reserved our position on this point.

25X1

9. I agree with the conclusion of the paper that we cannot now develop a plan of action to win the cold war which will provide a precise guidance for operations. Nevertheless I disagree with the conclusion of the paper that "an acceptable solution cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide." I still believe that a paper of much more precision could be developed which would be both a realistic program and a useful "guide" to future operations.



25X1

Acting Deputy Assistant Director
for Policy Coordination

25X1

Attachment (1)
As stated above

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

